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This article argues that the emphasis on asylum seekers is a 
distraction in the context of the overall considerations of Australia’s 
migration policy. The article discusses the development of the 457 
visa and the role of international students in developing Australia’s 
skilled migration program and goes on to consider the relationship 
between the policy of multiculturalism and the practice of assimilation 
for non-white migrants entering Australia’s middle class. To this end, 
the article introduces the ideas of ‘model minority’ and ‘honorary 
whiteness’ into discussions of the Australian situation. 
 
For three decades asylum seekers arriving by boat have provoked 
anxiety in Australia out of all proportion to their numbers. This anxiety 
was fanned after the election of John Howard’s coalition government 
in 1996 (McMaster, 2001). At the same time, during the time of 
Howard’s government, Australia rapidly increased its migration 
program for skilled labour. Historically, since the post-Second World 
War migration period, there has developed a race-based class system 
where the middle class has remained predominantly white, indeed 
Anglo-Celtic. The new skilled migration program, focusing on the 
development and use of the 457 Visa and on skilled migrants 
originally coming to Australia as international students, is transforming 
the racial organisation of the middle class. This article brings into 
Australian usage ideas that have been current for some time in the 
United States, the notion of a model minority which has been given 
the status of honorary whiteness, as a way to understand the effects 
of continuing discrimination, and the emphasis on assimilation, which 
pervade employment in the skilled, middle-class workforce. 
The public discussion of asylum seekers has especially focussed on 
those described as boat people—men, women and children crowded 
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onto small, often only putatively sea-worthy fishing boats struggling to 
make the journey from Indonesia to landfall within the Australian 
migration zone so that they can ask to be considered for the status of 
refugees. In 1992 Paul Keating’s Labor government introduced 
mandatory detention for asylum seekers heralding an increase in the 
number of detention centres across Australia. The Port Hedland 
Immigration Reception and Processing Centre had been opened the 
previous year. Woomera and Curtin were both opened in 1999.  
Through the 1990s and early 2000s politicians and the media ramped 
up the anxiety of Australians over the ‘threat’ posed by those 
boatloads of asylum seekers. Yet, in 1999–2000 the total number of 
asylum seekers arriving by boat was only 4,174. This was less than a 
third of the total number of asylum seekers, 13,100, who came to 
Australia in 2000. To put these figures into perspective, we need to 
know that in 2006-07, for example, around 177,000 people were 
allowed to enter Australia on a permanent basis, of these, over 
148,000 migrants were granted visas giving them permanent 
residency under the Skills and Family visa groupings and over 
493,000 people were allocated temporary entry visas for a variety of 
purposes from three-year work visas to short-term tourist visas. 
Why, then, has such concern been generated over such a 
comparatively small number of boat arrivals? One answer must be 
that they serve as a distraction. Australians have a history of anxious 
dislike of migration. In the post World War II era, when governments 
massively expanded Australia’s migration program in order to develop 
an industrial base, the project was made palatable to Australians still 
recovering from the fear of a Japanese military invasion in terms of 
‘populate or perish.’ It had been the right-wing politician, Billy Hughes, 
who coined the term in a speech in 1937. However, the fear of ‘Asian 
invasion’ is imbricated in the historical construction of Australia as a 
nation-state and is as old as federation. As Ruth Balint writes: ‘[t]he 
seed of Asian invasion anxiety was sown in the earliest moments of 
Australian nationhood’ (2005: 33). Donald Grant, a Labor senator, 
typified this anxiety of a white Australia that felt itself beleaguered in 
this speech in 1949:  
I emphasize that Australia is in a precarious position by reason of 
the fact that as a white people we are surrounded by Asiatics. 
Therefore, we must increase our population as quickly as possible. 
I believe that if we fail to increase our population to the maximum 
within the next twenty years we shall lose this country altogether … 
It is our duty to welcome migrants and to educate them to the 
Australian way of life so that, should the necessity arise, they will 
be prepared to fight alongside us. We must get the best people of 
the world to migrate to this country.[1]  
This was the kind of rhetoric also used by Labor’s post-war Minister 
for Immigration, Arthur Calwell, to gain support from the general public 
and the labour movement for the renovation of the migration program.   
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The need at that time was for unskilled workers. To take one example, 
the biggest Australian engineering project was the Snowy Mountains 
Hydro-Electric Scheme. It was initiated by the Snowy Mountains 
Hydro-Electric Power Act, 1949 and finally completed in 1974. In the 
words of Grahame Griffin, ‘it consisted of 16 large dams, 7 power 
stations (two underground), 80 kilometres of aqueducts and 140 
kilometres of tunnels’ (2003). Griffin explains that:  
During the 25 years of its construction, the scheme employed more 
than 100,000 men and women (the great majority were men) from 
30 countries.  At its peak the workforce was approximately 10,000, 
with the Australian-born constituting only one-third of that 
workforce. In a period of labour shortage in Australia, the Authority 
was forced to recruit much of its workforce from overseas, including 
those categorised as Displaced Persons, most of whom were of 
eastern and southern European extraction. Other workers were 
recruited from New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Ireland and 
western and northern Europe, including France, Germany, and 
Norway. The scheme therefore became a focal point within the 
broader vision of Australia's post-war immigration policy — a vision 
encouraged by the slogan of ‘populate or perish.’ 
Paul Robertson and Keith Trace write that: ‘[i]n terms of value-added, 
the post-war expansion of manufacturing was led by the motor 
vehicle, chemical, electrical, and metal products industries’ (1983: 
110). In the four years between October 1945 and Labor’s election 
loss at the end of 1949, Calwell was able to come close to achieving 
his plan which was for a net annual population increase of 1 per cent 
of the population, or around 70,000 migrants each year. Calwell, and 
later Ministers of Immigration, succeeded by extending the definition 
of ‘white’ to include southern Europeans, Maltese, Christian Lebanese 
and people from eastern Europe. Today, the invasion rhetoric that 
legitimated the population increase remains in the idea of boat people 
as a threat, and the understanding of them as being ‘Asian.’ 
My interest in this article, though, is not with boat people or even with 
asylum seekers more generally. Rather, I am interested in those that 
the public preoccupation with boat people makes invisible, the skilled 
migrants. Since the 1970s the increasing ease of communication and 
transport has enabled companies to move manufacturing out of 
Western countries to developing countries where labour costs are 
lower. John Quiggin (n.d.) has discussed this in the context of 
technological development. He writes that: ‘[t]he gradual decline in the 
proportion of jobs available to unskilled workers in most industries is 
evidence that the general tendency of technological change has been 
biased against unskilled labour.’ This development has entailed a 
fundamental shift in Australia’s migration preferences. Quiggin (ibid) 
remarks that, ‘the bias of technological change towards skilled 
workers has been balanced by an increase in the average education 
and skill levels of the workforce.’ To a significant extent this new 
balance has been achieved by making entry to Australia easier for 
those people with skills. In 2006-2007, 133,000 people were granted 
entry to Australia in the Skilled Migration program.  




Two changes in particular will concern me in this article. The first is 
the advent of the 457 visa. Initiated under Keating’s government, the 
457 visa was introduced by John Howard’s coalition government in 
1996. One of its key features is that, unlike migrant-driven visas, it is 
employer-driven. Employers in need of skilled workers find the people 
they need in other countries and apply for them to be given 457 visas 
to work for the employer in Australia. In this sense, the visa typifies 
the neoliberal understanding of the primacy of the market. Workers 
can be granted a visa for up to four years. However, the visa is 
renewable and if the worker can find another employer while onshore 
then that employer can apply for a 457 visa to re-employ the person. 
In this way a skilled worker can stay in Australia on a 457 visa until 
such time as no employer asks for their services. At a time when there 
is global competition for skilled workers, making employers 
responsible for finding and attracting them to Australia ensures a 
match between supply and demand. However, without appropriate 
regulation 457 visas place Australian skilled workers within a global 
market and drives down Australian wages. 
457 visas gained popularity rapidly. In 1996-7, the first year they were 
available, 8,463 were issued. By 2001-02 that number had increased 
to 15,646 (these figures come from Khoo et al, 2003: 29). By 2005-06, 
in a jump of over 40 per cent from the previous year, this figure rose 
to around 40,000 (Kinnaird, 2006: 49). These figures are for first entry, 
that is, they do not include applications for further 457 visas for people 
already in Australia on 457 visas. It is also possible for people already 
in Australia on other forms of temporary visa to acquire a 457 visa. 
These combined with the reissuing of 457 issues to previous holders, 
raised the total number of 457 visas issued in 2003-04 to 40,124 
(Khoo et al, 2007: 178). It should be clear from these figures that, with 
the government’s encouragement, 457 visas have become an 
increasingly important component in Australia’s skilled migration 
program. Indeed, writing in 2006, Bob Kinnaird remarked that: ‘[i]n 
2006-07, for the first time in Australia’s migration history, there will 
probably be more temporary skilled 457 visas granted than skilled 
permanent visas’ (2006: 49). It is significant that, as of 2006, as 
Kinnaird notes: ‘[t]here is no cap on the number of 457 visas issued 
each year,’ unlike the General Skilled Migration (GSM) program. 
Indeed, as Kinnaird asserts: ‘The 457 visa rules involved a radical 
deregulation of Australia’s temporary entry regime.’  
It is possible that the Australian government is deliberately favouring 
the 457 visa class over the GSM program which offers permanent 
residency. The context here is, again, the neoliberal idea of the 
primacy of the market. One increasingly favoured economic practice 
in large firms is to attempt to decrease the numbers of staff on long-
term contracts. That way, the argument goes, the firm becomes more 
flexible and cheaper to run. Staff can be laid off when demand 
decreases and staff can be employed in specific areas as the need 
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arises. Outsourcing is a different practice with a similar effect. In both 
cases the firm is also able to reduce its entitlement obligations to its 
staff. With the 457 visas, the country functions in much the same way 
as the firm I have just described. The 457 visa holder is the 
responsibility of the firm that employs them. Australia offers little in the 
way of the kind of entitlements that citizens or permanent residents 
have. For example, Medicare is only available to those from countries 
with a reciprocal arrangement, most 457 visa holders are required to 
take out private health insurance; in New South Wales fees are 
charged for children in state schools; no entitlements to social security 
and welfare benefits. Crucially, when the visa expires the holder has 
28 days to be re-sponsored, and therefore get another 457 visa, or 
leave the country. Thus, while 457 visa holders may stay in Australia 
for many years because they can be given more than one 457 visa, 
they have few entitlements or citizenship rights.  
There is, though, it should be added, a pathway from the 457 visa to 
permanent residency. This requires applying under the criteria of the 
Skilled Migration program. The point, however, is that from the 
perspective of the marketized state the 457 visa holder is the ideal 
worker. They enter with guaranteed employment and contribute in this 
way to the economic wellbeing of the state. They are the economic 
responsibility of the employer. The employee costs the state only a 
minimal amount and, when the employee becomes unemployed, they 
are forced to leave the country. There is here no sense of a state’s 
moral responsibility to those it has accepted within its borders. There 
is only a market-based relationship.  
The Commodification of Higher Education  
The second change that I want to address is the marketization of 
higher education as a pathway to permanent residency for skilled 
overseas students.  This development has taken place in two stages. 
The first involved the rapid inclusion of the Australian universities in 
the market economy. This began under Bob Hawke’s Labor 
government with its most obvious sign being the introduction of 
student fees in the form of the Higher Education Contribution Scheme 
(H.E.C.S.) in 1989. As a part of its more general marketized 
revisioning of higher education, the Howard government restructured 
H.E.C.S., increasing fees by an average of 40 per cent and creating a 
three tier system of cost depending on the perceived value of the 
course. However, what is more important for the argument I am 
making here is the massive decrease in the public funding of 
universities enacted by the federal government:  
The 1996 budget immediately cut direct public funding of 
universities: between 1996 and 1999, public-sourced funds per 
student dropped by a massive 20.1 percent. The government also 
implemented a 12 percent staff reduction at the federal education 
department. (Berman et al, 2007: 262) 
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This decrease in funding initiated a rapid turn to recruiting fee-paying 
international students as a way of making up the short-fall in public 
funding. Simon Marginson (2007) tells us that: 
In 1985 30,000 international visitors arrived in Australia for 
education … Twenty years later in 2005 there were 375,000 
educational visitors … The number of foreign students in the world 
multiplied by three but in Australia it multiplied by 12. In 2005 there 
were 164,000 international students onshore in higher education. 
Marginson (2007) notes that: ‘[i]n 2005 the [education] industry 
generated $11.3 billion in fees and other spending by [international] 
students, with more than $4 billion in fees, two thirds in higher 
education.’ International students provided 15 per cent of university 
funding overall in 2005 (ibid). More than this, education has become 
Australia’s third largest export earner behind only the primary 
industries of coal and iron ore. In 2007-08 it was worth $13.7 billion to 
the Australian economy through ‘tuition fees, goods and services 
related to living in Australia and tourism associated with visits from 
relatives’ (‘The Value of International Education to Australia’, n.d.). An 
Access Economics report gives even higher figures suggesting that 
the general contribution of international students to the Australian 
economy is $14.1 billion and that these students create a further 
$12.6 billion in value-added goods, services and jobs.[2] 
The second step has been the transformation of higher education into 
a means towards permanent residency for many of this increased 
number of fee-paying onshore international students. As Marginson 
(2007) remarks: ‘[m]ore than a third [of 2005’s 164,000 international 
students] could be expected to later obtain permanent residence.’ 
This has been achieved through changes in the points system used to 
judge an applicant’s eligibility for a visa granting permanent residency 
in the General Skilled Migration program. In July 2001 new onshore 
points-tested visa subclasses were introduced to enable international 
students studying in Australia to apply for a Skilled Migration program 
visa without leaving the country. A document put out by the 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (‘Skill Migration’, 
2003) explains how the points system works:  
The points-test recognises a range of skill-related factors. The 
number of points prescribed for each factor reflects the relative 
importance of an applicant’s potential contribution to Australia. The 
skill, age, English language and work experience components earn 
the highest number of points. Other recognised factors include 
Australian qualifications, spouse skills, Migration Occupation in 
Demand list (MODL) occupation, work experience obtained in 
Australia and fluency in a community language other than English. 
The same document notes that in 2002-03 ‘more than 50 per cent of 
successful General Skilled Migration (points tested) applicants 
claimed points for an Australian qualification.’ From the point of view 
of higher education the key requirement is a qualification which needs 
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the equivalent of two years study in Australia, completed in not less 
than eighteen months.  
It is worth considering this eighteen months minimum for a moment. It 
means that, setting aside the higher-education skill-acquisition 
process, the applicant for permanent residency will already have 
eighteen months of cultural and linguistic acculturation into Australian 
society. This is of particular pertinence because, as Geoffrey Brahm 
Levey (2008: 18) puts it, there was a ‘retreat from multiculturalism’ in 
Australia during the eleven years of the Howard government. In 
January 2007, the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 
had Citizenship substituted for Multicultural Affairs. More significantly, 
as Levey (2008: 19) notes, ‘federal reforms include a new citizenship 
test that emphasizes the English language proficiency and knowledge 
of Australian values and way of life.’ Levey (2008: 19) writes that: 
[a]ccording to the government’s announcement, the concern seems 
to be that talk of “multiculturalism” has sent the wrong signals to 
individuals and groups, that it has encouraged “separatism” and the 
idea that “anything goes.” The hope is that the language of 
“citizenship” and “integration” and a renewed emphasis on “core 
Australian values” will arrest those perceived trends.  
Within this context it is not surprising to find that the vast majority of 
international students come from non-English speaking, and indeed 
non-Western, countries. In 2007 the largest group came from China, 
107,071 (a growth of 18.9 per cent on 2006), followed by India, 
63,604 (a growth of 63.9 per cent on 2006), Republic of Korea, 34,674 
(a growth of 11.3 per cent on 2006), Thailand, 19,987 (a growth of 
11.9 per cent on 2006), Malaysia, 19,874 (a growth of 4 per cent on 
2006), Hong Kong, 19,742, Japan, 16,077, Indonesia, 14,919 and 
Brazil, 12,545. After Brazil comes the United States which contributed 
11,822 international students.[3] This totals to a figure considerably 
higher than the 2005 one used by Marginson and quoted earlier. 
Kieran James and Setsuo Otsuka (n.d.), writing about the racism 
faced by international students who gain Australian degrees in 
accountancy, note that their interviewees report being asked if they 
had gone to high school in Australia. James and Otsuka write that:  
[i]t appears that employers in Australia are especially reluctant to 
hire graduates who did not complete their high school, or a 
substantial part of it, in Australia. The reason appears to lie in the 
Marxist view of schools in capitalist countries being accepted 
socialisation agents to both train workers in the narrow technical 
skills required for their future occupation, and in the social 
behaviours expected in the workplace. 
It seems that employers are less sanguine about international 
students’ ability to assimilate Australian values than the government. I 
will address the way that Australians think of cultural difference in 
terms of race, and racism, later in this article.  
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This shift to a market-based understanding of higher education has 
contributed to a perception that no longer sees it as a right, an 
entitlement, a good that helps raise the quality of life of all members of 
the state but, rather, constructs it from the state’s perspective as an 
institution through which the state can manage the population. In this 
instance, by increasing the points in the MODL depending on what 
skills and professions the state considers are required in Australia, 
higher education becomes a channel of entry into the Australian state 
at a time when there is global competition for skilled and professional 
labour. The state border which is so clearly demarcated and which is 
patrolled with such rigour and military force to stop a few thousand 
asylum-seeking boat people entering Australia becomes permeable 
and almost invisible for international students, especially if they are 
studying for qualifications in areas in which Australia has needs. 
International Students and Permanent Residency 
In such a circumstance it is no surprise that many international 
students view Australian higher education as pragmatically as the 
state. A Chinese international student in Australia, Feifei Guo (n.d.), 
comments in her blog that ‘many [Chinese students] see overseas 
study as an immigration ticket.’ Guo quotes Danny Wong, a study-
abroad advisor with the Study Abroad Service Centre of Beijing 
Language and Cultural University: 
Australia is one of the most popular destinations for Chinese 
students. Not only because the good quality of higher education 
attracts Chinese students, but also the immigration policies.  
Almost every student who wants to study in Australia comes to my 
office with their parents to ask questions about the relationship 
between their study choices and the immigration policy. 
In a study conducted in early 2006, Molly Yang (2007: 6) asked 200 
Chinese why they were considering studying outside China, and 
where. Thirty-seven per cent were considering Australia compared 
with 24 per cent looking to the United States and Canada, and 17 per 
cent the United Kingdom. Of the students who wanted to study in 
Australia: ‘[t]he analysis revealed that over 49% of those students 
were influenced most by Australia’s high quality of education and 
future migration opportunities after graduation’ (Yang, 2007: 6). In the 
global competition, skilled labour predominately moves from 
developing countries to developed, Western countries which, provided 
one is able to access it, have a more elaborated social infrastructure 
(Gera, Laryea, & Songsakul, 2005). Guo quotes a Chinese student in 
Australia: 
[y]ou can’t deny that Australia has a much better living environment 
than China. Compared with Australia, the population of China is 
huge. Also Australia has a better social welfare system. Once you 
get permanent residency, life will become easier. (n.d,) 
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The final sentence here signals the increase in social security, welfare 
and other entitlements available to those with permanent residency 
visas as compared with the entitlements available to international 
students. For example, international students are allowed to work only 
twenty hours a week during the period of their course and are not 
entitled to Medicare.  
It is clear that Australia’s greater success in attracting international 
students, assuming that the United States and Britain are also thought 
to have high-quality higher education, lies in the ease with which 
international students who have studied in Australia can gain 
permanent residency. From a marketized, cost-benefit point of view, 
the extraordinary thing about the streamlined Australian system is 
that, while it makes Australia attractive to large numbers of potential 
international students, it provides the Australian state with skilled 
professionals in areas of need at no cost to the state. Indeed, 
because the students fund their own education, they also help, as we 
have seen, support the Australian university system and make a very 
significant contribution to the broader Australian economy. It does 
need to be added, however, that such a use implies a fundamental 
transformation in the meaning and practice of higher education. 
However, one very significant consequence of this use of higher 
education as a permeable border, a site of entry into the Australian 
state, is the increasing tendency of international students to take 
courses purely for the opportunity they offer for gaining permanent 
residence. As Bob Birrell et al (2006: 30) write: 
[w]hen the reforms advantaging overseas students trained in 
Australia were introduced in mid-1999 and mid-2001, it was not 
anticipated how enthusiastically overseas students and Australia’s 
universities would respond to the new migration rules. In the case 
of the overseas students, a majority have since enrolled in courses 
which are believed to provide a relatively assured permanent 
resident outcome. 
There is no guarantee that an international student who gains an 
Australian degree in, say, accounting, which scores high points on the 
MODL, will want to go on to practice accountancy once they have 
acquired permanent residency. Rather differently, there is also no 
guarantee, as we shall see, that someone who has arrived as an 
international student, and gained a degree in accountancy, will be 
able to find a position with an accountancy firm in Australia.  
The permeability of the Australian border for skilled workers is, in 
large part, made possible by the focus placed on boat people. This 
preoccupation with the exclusion of this small group has the 
advantage for the state of minimising public awareness and possible 
public concern over the general migration program.[4] As compared to 
the hundreds, or low thousands, of boat people who are picked up 
each year attempting to reach Australia, in 2006-07 the total intake 
under the Migration Program was 158,630. Of these, 108,540 were 
border lands 8:3 
10 
 
accepted through what is called the Skills Stream. While 457 visa 
recipients are not included in the Skills Stream, they are included in 
the total migration figure. Those international students who completed 
their courses and successfully applied for permanent residency are 
included in both figures.  
It is important to note here that permanent residency is not the same 
thing as Australian citizenship—a term I am using here in the 
technical sense in relation to the legal category of Australian citizen. 
Crucially, for its conceptual importance as a signification of 
membership of the Australian nation-state, as well as for its practical 
implications, a permanent resident is unable to vote in Australian 
political elections. There is one exception to this rule, those people 
who held British subject status and permanent residency in Australia 
before January 26, 1984, when the law was changed to exclude such 
people from the franchise. Also a permanent residency visa can be 
revoked by the Minister for Immigration under certain circumstances 
such as the holder’s conviction for serious crimes. Citizenship, 
however, under the Australian Citizenship Act 2007, can only be 
revoked for crimes committed before citizenship was granted or for 
the provision of misleading information that enabled the granting of 
citizenship. Thus, citizenship has both a political and legal difference 
from permanent residency. While the two statuses are usually 
grouped together in Australian residency statistics, permanent 
residents exist outside of the political system and their presence in 
Australia as with other visa holders, is subject to the Executive, in the 
person of the Minister, rather than to the legal system—though, as we 
shall see later in the case of Dr Mohamed Haneef, who did not have 
permanent residency, the Executive’s decision remains, to some 
extent, subject to judicial review.[5]  
Boat People and Unskilled Workers 
For Australians, boat people have come to represent the lumpen, 
unskilled racial Other attempting to breach Australia’s border. 
Discussing the way the Howard government handled the attempt by 
the MV Tampa to unload the asylum seekers at Christmas Island that 
it had picked up from their sinking boat in 2001, Suvendrini Perera 
(2002: 18) describes how: 
[t]he Australian government’s attempts to draw a line in the sea 
against the incursions of international law … are also being played 
out in a recognisably colonial and highly racialised register. The 
phobias and hatreds that emerged in Australian public life in the 
spring of 2001 open the door to a much older storehouse of 
images, narratives and representations.  
Elsewhere, writing about Howard’s government’s decision to send 
troops to the Solomon Islands to provide support for that country’s 
government, Perera (2006: 128) comments that: ‘[t]he Prime 
Minister’s language firmly positions Australia within the lineage of 
imperial whiteness.’ In ‘Borderline Anxieties’ I argued that, ‘from the 
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start, the borders of the Australian state, initiated at Federation, 
served a double purpose: to define that state, and the white, modern 
nation within it; and to function as part of a larger wall keeping out 
unwanted ‘coloured’ peoples, the colonised of Asia and of Africa and 
the American/Caribbean from Europe and its colonial outposts’ 
(Stratton, 2004: 235). In an article on Australia’s racialised reaction to 
boat people, Sonia Magdalena Tascón (2002) writes that, ‘our borders 
have become more rigid rather than more elastic in relation to them.’ 
This happened at the same time, in the 1990s and early 2000s, that 
the new visa regulations that I have been discussing, the advent of 
the 457 Visa and the changed conditions for international students to 
apply for permanent residency, were being put in place. 
As I have already indicated, the boat people have not only been 
racialised they have also been classed—that is, they have been 
constructed as unskilled and by implication either lumpen or, at best, 
lower working class. To give one example, the Democrats senator, 
Andrew Bartlett, in an article in 2007 sympathetic to the plight of 
incarcerated boat people, wrote that: 
[m]any hundreds of refugees—most of them from Afghanistan and 
Iraq—were sent to Nauru by Australia in 2001, and after tens of 
millions of dollars spent by the Australian government over four or 
five years trying to create the false impression these people were 
undesirables who should be kept out they were acknowledged to 
be refugees and brought back to Australia. Many of them 
immediately started working in jobs such as in the meatworks and 
agricultural industries, in states all over Australia—the same jobs I 
keep being told we can’t find enough workers for. Every year 
Australia allows in more than 100,000 people on Working Holiday 
visas, which our government promotes as a way to fill labour 
market gaps in seasonal and unskilled work. 
It was Bartlett’s idea that asylum seekers could make a worthwhile 
contribution to the community they wished to join by being allowed to 
take up these unskilled jobs. The reclassified asylum seekers that 
Bartlett refers to were people granted Temporary Protection Visas, a 
new category of visa with limited rights and entitlements, including a 
review of the person’s status as a refugee after three years, created 
by the Howard government in 1999 for asylum seekers who had been 
given refugee status. As it happens, many asylum seekers are highly 
skilled. On a ‘Facts and Stats’ page discussing both asylum seekers 
and refugees—the former are simply people not yet officially classified 
as the latter—the Refugee Council of Australia explain that: 
[i]t is a myth that all refugees are illiterate peasants. The majority 
that come to Australia are educated middle class people—whose 
education, profession or political opinions have drawn them to the 
attention of the authorities and resulted in their persecution. 
(‘Australia’s Refugee Program: Facts and Stats’, n.d.) 
Nevertheless, it is indeed a persuasive myth that asylum seekers are 
unskilled. The myth functions as part of a structural transformation of 
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the modern binary distinction between civilised and primitive, white 
and coloured. In this case the opposing term to unskilled is, of course, 
skilled. The kinds of jobs identified by Bartlett are ones which, as he 
implies, those in Australia, Australian citizens or permanent residents, 
when they have a choice, prefer not to take. These are the jobs that, 
in the United States and many European countries, are now done by 
illegal migrants or guest workers—that is, people who, in one way or 
another, do not have a status as members of the state. These people 
are raced as non-white. 
As mentioned earlier, migrants entering Australia, after the Second 
World War were channelled into unskilled and low-skilled, working-
class jobs. At that time Australia broadened its definition of who was 
white with the result that large numbers of the migrants who would 
previously have been excluded as non-whites were now accepted. As 
I have argued elsewhere, this produced a long-standing, racialised 
class structure in Australia where ethnicity became a category used to 
describe those identified as white but still discriminated against 
because they were not fully white, not as white as the people who 
could trace their heritage to Britain or northern Europe, and possibly 
Ireland (Stratton, 2009). When multiculturalism was introduced in the 
late 1970s as a population management policy, it mapped onto the 
established racialised class structure. Thus, middle-class hegemony 
in Australia remained, essentially, Anglo-Celtic, northern European 
and, above all, white. The racialised boat people on the other side of 
the border function to unify the still predominantly working-class and 
marginalised not-fully-white ethnics with the Anglo-Australian white 
middle class.  
Skilled Workers and Australian Values  
The boat people also distract from the changes that are taking place 
in the composition of the middle class. In 2007-08, 28,029 migrants 
arrived in Australia from the United Kingdom. This represented 17.7 
per cent of the total migration program. Britain remains the largest 
source of migrants, and we can assume that the vast majority of these 
are white. This percentage of the total migration program is in decline 
from a peak in 2005-06 of 22.5 per cent. This, though, is not a steady 
decrease in percentage. In the late 1990s, the percentage of migrants 
drawn from Britain had declined to less than fifteen per cent. The 
percentage increases again after 2001-02, that is, at the time of the 
introduction of the 457 visa. Looked at from the other way round, in 
March 2006 there were 12,186 people from the United Kingdom in 
Australia on 457 visas. This represents 26.6 per cent of all holders of 
these visas. The next highest percentage of holders comes from India 
representing only 7.4 per cent or 3,393 people (Kinnaird, 2006: 55). 
Now, 457 visa holders already have skills, professional qualifications, 
so it is not that surprising that these people should be drawn 
predominately from developed countries where there are many people 
with the relevant training and qualifications. At the same time, the 457 
visa is, as we have seen, employer-driven, so it seems that, given the 
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choice, which there were, Australian employers still prefer to employ 
Britons over any other national group. The effect of this, as I have just 
shown, is to increase the Anglo, white component of the Australian 
middle class.  
This is particularly important because Australians have come to think 
of race in terms of culture. In Race Daze I discussed this development 
in relation to the right-wing populist politician, Pauline Hanson:  
Hanson typifies the new kind of racist, really espousing a kind of 
culturalism, in which particular cultures are considered to be 
incompatible with, in this case, what is claimed to be Australian 
national culture and this claimed fundamental cultural difference is 
visibly marked by race. In this thinking, culture is not reduced to 
race, race works as a signifier of it and, as a consequence, as 
Hanson insists, small numbers of racially different people can be 
allowed into the country provided that they actively acculturate to 
Australian culture. (Stratton, 1998: 13-4, original emphasis) 
Cultural difference has come to signify racial difference. Since it is 
assumed that cultural norms are founded in religion—for example, the 
claim that Australian culture is a consequence of the country’s Judeo-
Christian heritage—then religious difference signifies cultural 
difference which, in turn, signifies racial difference. It is this logic 
which founds the mis-identification of Muslims as a race and, with the 
claim that the majority of boat people are Muslim, suggests that they 
have different values from Australians. Tascón (2002) gives recent 
examples of this culturalist way of thinking:  
culture continues to be invoked today, to mark the irreconcilable 
differences between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ In an interview on ABC’s Four 
Corners (13 September 2001), the Minister for Immigration related 
the self-harm of the detainees in Port Hedland Detention Centre to 
their ‘culture’: “the sorts of things people from those parts of the 
world are used to doing.” … During the ‘children overboard affair’ in 
2001 when asylum seeker children were supposedly thrown into 
the ocean from their boat by their parents, Mr Howard as Prime 
Minister and Mr Ruddock as Minister for Immigration, spouted their 
horror at ‘the sorts of things these people were capable of doing.’ 
Tascón’s examples show how asylum-seeking boat people have been 
constructed as having fundamentally different, and morally wrong, 
cultural values when compared to Australian, for which we need to 
read white, values. British migrants, however, are thought to reinforce 
the long-standing British grounding of Australia’s hegemonic culture, 
and its founding values, whilst simultaneously reinforcing Australia’s 
whiteness.  
Supplementing the 26.6 per cent of British 457 visa holders is a 
further 22.3 per cent drawn from countries Australians have 
traditionally thought of as white, including three British settler colonies: 
the United States, Canada and South Africa. The United States 
contributed five per cent as did South Africa (given the racial structure 
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of South Africa we can presume these skilled visa holders to be 
white), Ireland contributed 4.1 per cent and Germany 3.4 per cent. 
Canada contributed 2.8 per cent. White countries with close ties to 
Euro-American modernity, and especially to Britain, therefore, made 
up 49.9 per cent of the total 457 visa holders in 2006. These people 
helped to reinforce the whiteness, and by implication the traditional 
values, those, for example, held by Ruddock and Howard, of the 
Australian middle class.  
I have already noted that India contributed the second highest number 
of 457 visa holders with a comparatively small 7.4 per cent. One 
possible reason for India’s relatively high contribution may be its 
history of British colonisation which has had the consequence that 
many of the middle class speak English as a first or second language. 
India was followed by China with five per cent, Japan with 4.9 per cent 
and the Philippines with 4.1 per cent. Malaysia, another country 
colonised by the British and where English continues to be generally 
spoken, came in last out of the top twelve countries contributing 1.8 
per cent or 810 people. We should note that there is no Middle 
Eastern, or for that matter no Latin American, country in this 12 and, 
bearing in mind white Australian anxieties over Muslims, Malaysia is 
the only country of the twelve where Islam is the dominant religion.  
Where all the ‘white’ countries are thought to share to a large extent a 
similar set of fundamental values, and indeed Christianity in various 
forms as a dominant religion, the non-Western, non-white countries 
are all considered to have quite diverse cultures with little in common. 
They cannot, therefore, be considered as a more or less unitary block 
like the white grouping except in white Australian terms as the ‘Asian’ 
racial/cultural Other. We can see then, that the introduction of the 457 
Visa has had the possibly unexpected consequence of reinforcing the 
white Australian middle class, and its hegemonic Anglo-Celtic 
Australian culture, at the same time that the Howard government 
moved Australia away from multiculturalism and towards a renewed 
emphasis on ‘Australian values’ and the Australian way of life—which, 
in reality, meant white, Anglo-Celtic Australian culture. Indeed, since 
October 2007, all applicants for a 457 visa, like all applicants for visas 
granting permanent residency, and applicants for some temporary 
visas, have had to sign an Australian Values Statement.[6] In the 
words of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship’s webpage: 
‘[t]he statement requires applicants to confirm that they will respect 
the Australian way of life and obey the laws of Australia before being 
granted a visa’ (‘Living in Australia: Australian Values’, n.d.). At the 
same time as this reinforcement of white hegemony, and this is a 
point to which I shall return shortly, we need to remember that just 
over 21.2 per cent of 457 visas out of the top twelve countries were 
granted to people from a wide variety of Asian cultural 
backgrounds.[7] 
After Britain, the two source countries that contributed the most 
migrants in 2007-08 were India with 14 per cent or 22,146 people and 
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China with 13 per cent or 20,729 people. In 2006-07 China 
contributed slightly more than India. Between them Britain, India and 
China contribute just under 50 per cent of Australia’s migrants, a total 
of 70,904 annually with, in 2007-08, South Africa considerably further 
back on 7,178 and the Philippines on 6,721. These figures are gross, 
that is, they do not take into account those people from those 
countries who leave, mostly to return to their country of origin. When 
these are included, the net overseas migration figures for 2006-07 
show China as the biggest contributor on 23,000 followed by Britain 
with 22,840 and India with 17,410.[8] In broad terms, since around 
1990, that is around the time that anxiety was beginning to be ramped 
up about the boat people asylum seekers with mandatory detention 
being introduced in 1992, there has been a significant increase in 
migration from China and India with each country’s contribution 
beginning to match or surpass migration from Britain. Indeed as the 
Department of Immigration and Citizenship’s Report on Migration 
Program 2007-08 puts it: 
[i]n terms of regions the Indian sub-continent [which includes Sri 
Lanka, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Nepal] now provides 19.9 
per cent of the Migration Program (an increase from 18.6 per cent 
in 2006-07). North Asia [which includes China, Republic of Korea, 
Hong Kong, Japan, Vietnam and Taiwan] provided 21.14 per cent 
of the 2007-08 Migration Program.  
To put it differently, and using the conventional Australian 
understanding of ‘Asian,’ which would include both these figures, 
Asian migration for 2007-08 would be thought of as just over 41 per 
cent of the total.  
We need to relate this figure to the directedness of post-1980s 
migration towards skills. While, as we have seen, the 457 Visa has 
had the effect of proportionally increasing British migration, much of 
the Asian migration that I have just identified comes from international 
students seeking permanent residency after qualifying. I have already 
mentioned Marginson’s informed estimate that over a third of 
international students subsequently apply for permanent residency. 
On Marginson’s 2005 figure of 164,000, which is considerably lower 
than the numbers I have quoted for 2007, this suggests a minimum of 
around 55,000 international students, some with spouses and 
children, achieving permanent residency. We can see that this would 
form the majority of the migration intake from China and India. In other 
words, the bulk of the Asian-identified migration intake since the 
1990s, and especially since the changes allowing international 
students to apply for permanent residency onshore, has been skilled, 
trained in Australia and already residing in Australia for a minimum of 
eighteen months before applying for permanent residency.  
We now need to remember the structural organisation of Australian 
society that I outlined earlier. The not-fully-white Australians and their 
descendents who arrived as unskilled workers after the Second World 
War remain, in large numbers, in the working class. Middle-class 
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Australia, the Australia of skills, professional qualifications and 
salaried positions in business and politics, remains preponderantly the 
province of the Anglo-Celtics, the so-called mainstream Australia 
which is the source for ‘Australian values’ and the hegemonic 
Australian culture. What, then happens to these Asian-identified 
migrants as they find themselves in this white Australian middle 
class? The first thing to remember here is how Australian 
multiculturalism works—that is, with a core and periphery structure 
(see, for example, Stratton, 1998: 34-40). The core is the Anglo-Celtic 
culture, which is primarily middle class with a large working-class 
component. The periphery is composed of those described in terms of 
ethnic and racial difference but thought of in terms of cultural diversity. 
This multicultural periphery is, generally speaking, working class. It is, 
at the least, suggestive that the Howard government’s retreat from 
multiculturalism, which, after all, had been put in place in response to 
the lack of assimilation by those not-fully-white Greeks, Lebanese, 
Maltese, southern Italians and other groups of unskilled, or at least 
classified as unskilled, post World War II migrants, should come as 
significant numbers of skilled, Asian-identified migrants are positioned 
within the hegemonic Anglo-Australian middle class.   
Honorary Whiteness and Model Minority Status  
In multiculturalism, the celebration of ethnic differences has also been 
a way of establishing distance from middle-class, white, Anglo-Celtic 
Australia. The problem for this group now is, in the first instance, how 
to incorporate this new Asian-identified flow of people in such a way 
as to preserve their invisibility. Elsewhere, in a discussion of Jews, I 
have written about invisibility as a tactic of the oppressed group 
(Stratton, 2000: 101, original emphasis):  
[t]his is as a subaltern tactic to escape the threat posed to you by 
the dominant population. Again, I want to emphasise that this way 
of thinking is not unique to the Ashkenazi Jews, it has been a 
characteristic of many migrants, and minority groups, in 
circumstances where they have not been accepted for what they 
are, but attacked for their difference. It is, to coin a phrase, the 
attempt to become invisible to the host population.   
This also applies to minority groups in Australian middle-class, 
hegemonic whiteness. However, here, because of the pervasive racial 
organisation of Australian society, there is, in addition, a need on the 
part of the white middle class to make the new Asian-Australians 
invisible through a process of assimilation, couched in terms of the 
acceptance of Australian values and the provisional attribution of 
honorary whiteness. The fear would be that, were these people to be 
visible, there would be a generalised racist backlash aimed, in 
particular, at Asian-identified migrants.  
Aihwa Ong (2006: 127) has written about the Chinese-background 
middle class in California:  
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[e]thnic Chinese command of the transnationalized electronics 
industry has placed them at the top of the ethnic hierarchy in 
California as ideal border-crossing and enterprising citizens vital to 
American business. The new status of the cyberhero (think of Jerry 
Yang of Yahoo) has recoded ethnic Chinese, endowing them with 
an honorary whiteness that represents a new form of exclusion, in 
the way that the model minority citizen initially excluded non-Asian 
Americans. 
From its earliest usage, probably by the Hungarian-born, British 
resident, Jewish humourist and travel writer George Mikes in his 
account of Jamaica published in 1967, Not by Sun Alone, honorary 
whiteness has been a term that is increasingly used, especially in the 
United States, to describe groups who, in particular, usually national, 
contexts are allowed the status of whiteness while there is continuing 
recognition that the members of the group are not white. In the 
quotation above, Ong emphasises the exclusionary aspect of the 
granting of honorary whiteness. In the context of the new presence of 
significant numbers of people identified as Asian in the Australian 
middle class I want to start by emphasising the term’s inclusive 
aspect. Given the anxiety about ‘Asians’ that permeates the Australian 
national imaginary, those identified as ‘Asian’ in the Australian middle 
class are already excluded. However, they are given a conditional 
acceptance into the middle class, a granting of honorary whiteness 
provided they accept ‘Australian values’ and the Australian way of life. 
Thinking of this in terms of honorary whiteness is a way of 
acknowledging their difference while preserving the integrity of white, 
Anglo-Australian hegemony.  
At this point we need to note that there are differences in the ways 
that middle-class Asian-Australians are perceived by the white middle 
class, that those Asians who have arrived through the international 
student channel tend to be less accepted than those who have been 
born in Australia—and whose marker of Australianness is often an 
Australian accent and a first-language grasp of Australian English. 
The latter are able to make themselves more invisible. A female 
colleague, who has a Chinese background, emailed me to say that 
honorary whiteness ‘reminds me of one of my high school friends 
telling me he didn’t particularly like Asians but didn’t think of me as 
Asian. I wasn’t sure whether to be flattered to be called an honorary 
white or to be offended.’ This anecdote exemplifies a particular form 
of racism where the known person is distinguished from the general 
group against which the individual is prejudiced. It is often used by 
members of the dominant group to grant honorary membership. In 
England in the 1960s my father would distinguish the ‘good’ West 
Indian he employed as against West Indians as a group against whom 
he was racially prejudiced. While the high-school friend in the 
narrative above fits this category, the context of Australian 
multiculturalism adds a further inflection. It is highly likely that the 
‘Asians’ that this individual ‘didn’t particularly like’ were those who 
celebrated their ethnicity according to the organisation of Australian 
multiculturalism; that is, my colleague was acceptable not only 
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because she was known but also because she appeared to be 
assimilated into (middle-class) Australian values.     
Nevertheless, middle-class Asian-Australians remain identified and 
fundamentally excluded, as the term honorary whiteness signifies—
and as my colleague implies by her ambivalence after being granted it 
by a white arbiter. The tenuousness of their inclusive acceptance as 
honorary whites is apparent in what happens to those who do not 
appear to accept Anglo-Australian, middle-class values. One high-
flying, and as it happens non-Asian, example is the American, Sol 
Trujillo. Trujillo was appointed Chief Executive Officer of Telstra in 
2005. In 2009 he stood down and returned to the United States where 
he complained about Australian racism in an interview with the BBC 
(see Lane, 2009). In Australia, Trujillo’s brashness and bluntness 
alienated him, as did the large remuneration he was given. He was 
perceived not to have Australian values. Trujillo is the son of Mexican 
migrants and, as the Australian dislike of him increased, so his 
background became increasingly highlighted—not that he was 
American but that he was Hispanic. This included, for example, 
cartoons of Trujillo in a sombrero, waving guns around, in the image 
of a stereotypical Mexican bandit. Nevertheless, the Australian media 
reacted strongly to Trujillo’s claim of racism. Discussing the case, in 
an article titled ‘Sol Was Right: We Are Racist,’ Ezequiel Trumper 
(2009), at newmatilda.com, has argued that:  
[r]acial stereotypes in the media abound not just in the domain of 
tabloid journalism but also in those parts of our media with 
pretensions to quality. Australian financial commentators, 
supposedly well educated people, had no qualms about using a 
wide range of Spanish words to refer to Trujillo and his executives 
disparagingly. Trujillo's complaints over the way he was portrayed 
by the media in Australia were not new. He had said the same thing 
about his Australian experience to the Financial Times in the 
middle of his tenure. 
When told on camera that Trujillo had left the country, the prime 
minister, Kevin Rudd, waved and, with a smile, said, ‘Adios.’ The 
Australian middle-class rejection of this not-fully-white overseas 
appointment (he would have been on a 457 visa) was expressed in 
the withdrawal of his honorary whiteness and the corresponding 
emphasis on his racial/cultural difference.  
Dr Mohamed Haneef provides another, this time ‘Asian,’ example. 
Haneef trained as a doctor in Bangalore. After working in Britain he 
obtained a 457 Visa and started work at the Gold Coast Hospital in 
2006. On 2 July, 2007, Haneef was arrested at Brisbane Airport on 
the way to India to see his new baby daughter who had neo-natal 
jaundice. Haneef was accused of being a terrorist and helping his 
cousins who attacked Glasgow Airport by giving them a SIM card 
before he left Britain for Australia. It was subsequently ascertained 
that Haneef’s SIM card was not used in the bombing, as had been 
thought. However, without any proof, Haneef was treated as a 
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terrorist. On 16 July, Haneef was freed on bail. The Minister for 
Immigration, Kevin Andrews, immediately revoked Haneef’s visa on 
character grounds—the Executive, here, challenging the rule of law. 
Haneef chose not to post bail as doing so would have seen him 
immediately taken to Villawood detention centre. On 27 July, the 
charges against Haneef were dropped. However, Andrews refused to 
rescind his decision to revoke Haneef’s visa. On the same day 
Haneef’s passport was returned to him. Without a visa he had no 
option but to leave the country which he did on 28 July. The Federal 
Court reinstated Haneef’s visa on 26 December. In spite of an inquiry 
headed by retired New South Wales Supreme Court judge John 
Clarke finding that Haneef had been wrongly charged and wrongly 
detained, the Rudd federal government has refused to apologise on 
the grounds that the previous government was responsible for the 
wrongful actions—which seems inconsistent given that Rudd did 
apologise for the wrongs previous governments had inflicted on the 
Aborigines of the Stolen Generations.  
Haneef’s invisibility, his conditional honorary whiteness as a member 
of the middle class, was removed when he was thought to be a 
possible terrorist. Haneef has said that, ‘he had never experienced 
any racism from colleagues or patients while working at the Hospital 
and his idea of Australia as a fair country had not been changed’ (‘Dr 
Haneef still indecisive about returning to Australia’, 2008). At the time 
of his arrest, however, he became a highly visible Muslim Indian. As 
he himself insightfully said, that he was targeted ‘might be just 
because I am an Asian Muslim’ (Dr Haneef qtd from ‘I was targeted’ 
(2008). The claim of terrorism was used to justify the subsequent 
actions against him but it was his identification as a Muslim Indian, 
triggering white Australian anxieties about Muslims and about Asians, 
which allowed the increasingly questionable actions, from both a 
moral and legal perspective, to go relatively unchallenged by white 
Australians.   
Haneef already had his medical qualification when he came to 
Australia. However, the provisionality of honorary whiteness also 
applies to international students. Michiel Baas is an anthropologist 
who studied a group of Indian students in Melbourne. He found that 
‘by far the largest group of Indian students’ are studying in Australia in 
order to be eligible for permanent residency’ (Baas, 2006: 21): 
[m]any claim to have come to Australia for a ‘better lifestyle’, which 
refers both to basic things like clean air, good infrastructure, a safer 
society and better public facilities, as well as to better opportunities 
on the job front and generally more money. Interesting though, it is 
this … group which often seems to end up in jobs such as a taxi 
driver, security guard or petrol pump attendant. 
It would seem that, when not moving into the middle-class jobs 
associated with their qualifications, these skilled permanent residents 
end up in jobs the status of which is not much higher than the jobs 
which Andrew Bartlett was recommending for detained asylum 
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seekers. These are the kinds of jobs taken by students, and especially 
international students, to make some extra money. Often, this is 
because of the twenty hours limit per week on paid work that I 
mentioned earlier—many of these jobs are off the books enabling the 
students to work longer hours. Baas’ point is that many Indians in 
Australia continue in this employment after gaining the qualifications 
that enable them to attain permanent residency. Baas (2006: 22) 
comments that:  
[t]he money the students will make, even as taxi drivers, or security 
guards in a local shopping mall, will always be more than what they 
saw themselves making in India. In this sense they have got 
exactly what they wanted. 
They have not, however, given white Australia what it wanted from 
them, their skilled labour, and so their honorary whiteness has been 
withdrawn. The jobs they achieve are those associated with racialised 
groups such as asylum seekers and, in other countries, guest 
workers.  
Sometimes honorary whiteness is withheld through the racism of 
employers. Many Asians who gain permanent residency after 
successfully completing courses that score highly on the MODL are 
unable to find work in their chosen career. James and Otsuka (n.d.), 
in their study of the racism in the employment of international students 
who gain accountancy degrees in Australia, write that:  
[I]nternational students typically mail out large numbers of job 
applications to Australian firms with very little success. […] Many 
high-achieving Chinese graduates, after failing to find suitable 
accountancy-related work, accept cleaning, labouring and sales 
jobs in Australia and/or quietly return to China.  
James and Otsuka go on to write that: ‘Indian, Bangladeshi, Sri 
Lankan and Chinese graduates, according to one interviewee, are 
working in sales jobs at petrol kiosks and convenience stores, 
creating something of a marginalised underclass.’ A study by Alison 
Booth, Andrew Leigh and Elena Varganova enables us to put this 
discrimination in context. Booth et al (n.d.) sent out 5000 fictional job 
applications for advertised positions in four different categories of job: 
wait staff, data entry, customer service and sales. They were able to 
identify the employers as Anglo-Saxon—that is, white in Australian 
terms. For each type of job they sent the same application, only 
varying the name to signal a particular racial/ethnic background. The 
backgrounds they chose were Anglo-Saxon (their term), Indigenous, 
Italian, Middle Eastern and Chinese. They found that, for men and 
women combined:  
[f]or Anglo-Saxon-sounding names, the mean callback rate was 35 
percent. However, names connoting the four minority groups 
received a lower callback rate, with Indigenous applicants obtaining 
an interview 26 percent of the time, Chinese 21 percent of the time, 
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Italian 32 percent of the time, and Middle Eastern 22 percent of the 
time. (Booth et al, n.d.: 9) 
We can see here a racial/ethnic hierarchy operating in the context of 
employment, a hierarchy that places people with Chinese and Middle 
Eastern backgrounds as the least desirable employees. Booth et al 
found that the greatest amount of discrimination was for waitstaff and 
data entry jobs where, for waitstaff, ‘[a] Chinese and Middle Eastern 
person … must submit fully twice as many applications in order to get 
as many interviews as an Anglo-Saxon applicant’ (Booth et al, n.d.: 
10). They go on to write that:  
[c]uriously, the one job in which the level of discrimination appears 
to be lower is customer service, in which there is no statistically 
significant discrimination against any of the minority groups. This is 
also the one occupation in which those with more education were 
more likely to receive an interview. (ibid: 12) 
From the point of view of my argument this is not curious: the greater 
the amount of education the more likely that the applicant would be 
perceived to be middle class. They would then be attributed honorary 
whiteness.  
We should note the apparent relative lack of discrimination against 
people with Italian-identifiable names. Booth et al also conducted 
another study in which they sent out over 2000 letters to ‘wrong’ 
addresses. The envelopes had names linking the addressee with one 
of the five groups already listed. The study sought to ascertain if there 
was a variation in return rate attributable to the name-based 
identification of the addressees. What they found was that there was a 
3-5 per cent drop in the return rate of all letters addressed to people 
with non-Anglo-Saxon names. This included those with Italian names. 
What this suggests, I would argue, is that, while white employers are 
prepared to employ people identified as having Italian backgrounds, 
probably because they are thought to be second or third generation 
and therefore to have ‘Australian values,’ Anglo-Australians are less 
prepared to deal with Italian-background people socially—indeed as 
equally unwilling as they are to socialise with people with Chinese or 
Middle Eastern backgrounds. It also seems that Italian-background 
employers ‘appear to be significantly less likely to call back job 
candidates with Italian names’ (Booth et al, n.d.). It seems that Italian-
background employers have internalised the dominant, white middle-
class racial/ethnic prejudices.  
In an article on the online essay site, Helium, Anthony Mukwita (n.d.), 
writing about the racism faced by African students in Australia, 
describes how John Banda, working the graveyard shift in an all-night 
fast food restaurant in Perth, is asked by a customer: ‘“[h]ow come 
there are so many blacks here … shouldn’t they be working at the 
farms shearing sheep or picking tomatoes or something?”’ In the 
Australian racialised job hierarchy, these jobs rank below the working-
class manufacturing and construction jobs that typified the work of the 
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ethnicised, not-fully-white migrants, some of whom were very well 
qualified, of the post-Second World War period.[9] More, the 
reference to pastoral work suggests that the interlocutor was 
mistaking the black African serving him with an Indigenous Australian, 
perhaps even not realising a distinction—some sort of ‘all blacks are 
the same’ claim. There is a further racism here, then, which is the 
assumption that Indigenous Australians ought to be working in the 
bush and not present in the city.  
William Petersen coined the term ‘model minority’ in a New York 
Times editorial in 1966 to describe the success of Japanese-
Americans in American society. The key to model minority status is 
the acceptance of the fundamental values and goals of the dominant, 
white culture. This implies the kind of assimilation asked for in the 
Howard government’s ‘Australian values’ campaign. In the terms of 
the multicultural organisation of Australian society, the reward for such 
assimilatory behaviour is not being included in the multicultural 
celebrations of ethnic difference—which are actually an 
acknowledgement of the ethnic/racial fracture on which white 
Australian hegemony depends. The Indians, Chinese, Vietnamese 
and other Asian migrants who arrived in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
often with few skills, many of them as it happens as boat people 
seeking asylum, and who joined the ethnicised working class like the 
Italians, Greeks, Lebanese and other southern and eastern European 
groups who arrived in the 1940s and 1950s, also joined this 
‘celebration’ of multiculturalism. In a book on whiteness in Britain, 
Steve Garner (2007: 78) argues that: 
[p]eople who are not white can be absorbed into honorary 
whiteness in particular circumstances, yet this invariably involves 
othering different groups. In fact this othering appears constitutive 
of the process of redrawing of the boundary of whiteness in terms 
of values, so that it embraces British black or Asian people, 
depending on the context. In confirming shared values both the 
groups that share and do not share them are defined.  
In Australia since the 1980s the conditional inclusion of skilled ‘Asians’ 
in the white middle class, with the assimilatory claim of their adoption 
of Australian values, has been reinforced by the racialisation of 
asylum seekers and the assertions that ‘they’ do not share ‘our’ 
culture and values. It is these skilled, middle-class ‘Asians,’ many of 
whom have arrived as international students paying for their own 
education, who are offered to a greater or less degree honorary 
whiteness and who, in accepting the values of white, Anglo-Australia, 
form an invisible model minority in the hegemonic white middle class 
conditional on their acceptance of those values.  
Jon Stratton is Professor of Cultural Studies at Curtin University 
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Notes 
1. Senator Grant, ‘Estimates and Budget Papers 1949–50’, Senate, 
Debates, 19 October 1949, p. 1561 quoted in Kendall (2008: 56). 
2. The Access Economics figures come from Slattery (2009: 5).   
3. These figures come from ‘2007 Annual International Student 
Statistics’ (2007). 
4. As I write this paper there is increasing concern among Indian 
students in Melbourne about racially motivated attacks. For the most 
detailed discussion to date see Healy (2009). See also Suvendrini 
Perera and Jon Stratton, ‘Introduction: Heterochronotopes of 
Exception and the Frontiers and Faultlines of Citizenship’, Continuum: 
Journal of Media and Cultural Studies, vol 23, no 5, 2009. This article 
is the Introduction to a special section of this issue of Continuum 
which focuses on the Australian treatment of asylum seekers. 
5. The range of judicial review, however, has been increasingly limited 
over the last twenty years. In 1989, to take an important example, the 
Labor government, tightening up the border regime, introduced 
mandatory deportation of illegal non-citizens, mostly visa overstayers, 
regardless of their time in Australia or their circumstances. See 
Nicholls (2007), Deported: A History of Forced Departures from 
Australia, especially Chapter 9 ‘Mandatory deportation and detention.’ 
6. The Australian Values Statement reads in part: ‘I confirm that I have 
read, or had explained to me, information provided by the Australian 
Government on Australian society and values. I understand: • 
Australian society values respect for the freedom and dignity of the 
individual, freedom of religion, commitment to the rule of law, 
Parliamentary democracy, equality of men and women and a spirit of 
egalitarianism that embraces mutual respect, tolerance, fair play and 
compassion for those in need and pursuit of the public good; • 
Australian society values equality of opportunity for individuals, 
regardless of their race, religion or ethnic background; • the English 
language, as the national language, is an important unifying element 
of Australian society. I undertake to respect these values of Australian 
society during my stay in Australia and to obey the laws of Australia.’ 
7. All these figures derive from Kinnaird (2006). Kinnaird also notes 
that 6.7 per cent of those granted 457 visas have inadequately 
described countries of origin.  
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8. These figures come from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2008). 
In all these calculations I have left out the high numbers of New 
Zealanders who move to Australia. In 2006-07 there was a net 
overseas migration of New Zealanders to Australia of 21,420. 
9. There is a story that I have been told about a migrant who came in 
the 1960s. Before she left her country of origin she asked if, in 
Australia, there were jobs for librarians. She was told that there were. 
When she arrived in Australia she realized that she had been 
misunderstood—that there were jobs for labourers but not librarians. 
This story sounds to me like an urban myth. It is a story that explains, 
from a migrant perspective, why migrants did not get the skilled 
positions for which they had the training. 
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